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Abstract - Taxable (and broad) income elasticities are estimated using 
tax return data from 1979 to 2001. Data from the Continuous Work 
History Survey (CWHS) yield an estimated taxable income elastic-
ity for the 1990s that is about half the corresponding 1980s estimate. 
Estimates from the full Statistics of Income, which heavily oversamples 
high–income fi lers, generally confi rm the CWHS results. More so-
phisticated income control brings the estimates for the two decades 
closer together—to 0.40 for the 1980s and 0.26 for the 1990s. Work by 
Kopczuk (2005) implies that the narrowing of the tax base since 1986 
could account for 14 to 29 percent of the remaining difference.
INTRODUCTION
The degree to which taxes alter U.S. economic activity and tax–reporting behavior is a subject of debate. Estimates of 
the effect range from extremely large to almost none. For even 
modest changes to tax rates, the range of estimates implies 
differences in deadweight loss and income–tax revenue of 
many tens of billions of dollars. A key variable at the center 
of recent research is the elasticity of taxable income (ETI), 
which measures the responsiveness of reported taxable 
income to changes in marginal tax rates.1 The ETI, if accurately 
estimated, can be used to calculate both the change in dead-
weight loss2 and the change in income–tax revenue resulting 
from a change in tax rates.3 However, in practice, assessing 
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 1 Speciﬁ cally, the ETI equals the percentage change in reported taxable income 
associated with a one–percent increase in the net–of–tax rate, where the 
net–of–tax rate equals one minus the marginal tax rate.
 2 Feldstein (1999) shows that deadweight loss = –0.5 · (TaxRate)2 · (1 – TaxRate)–1 
· ETI · TaxableIncome.
 3 The change in income tax revenue equals ETI · TaxableIncome · Δt · (t/1 – t), 
where t is the tax rate. This can be derived as follows: 
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both the efﬁ ciency and revenue implica-
tions of tax–rate changes is more complex 
than the formulas suggest. For example, 
if the ETI differs by income, an accurate 
assessment of either efﬁ ciency or revenue 
implications requires a breakdown of the 
responses by income group.4
Despite a great deal of variation in ETI 
estimates, both across studies and within 
studies that explore different speciﬁ ca-
tions, several recent papers have reported 
an overall ETI of about 0.40. An often–cited 
study by Gruber and Saez (2002) examines 
responses to the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986, 
and ﬁ nds an overall estimated ETI of 0.40. 
However, Kopczuk (2005) ﬁ nds similarly 
estimated results to be quite sensitive to 
sample selection and model speciﬁ cation. 
Both Giertz (2006) and Heim (2007) also 
report estimates for the 1990s that are very 
sensitive to an array of factors. Others 
(e.g., Saez (2004) and Goolsbee (1999)) 
report great heterogeneity in estimated 
responses across time periods.
The estimation portion of this paper ﬁ rst 
replicates Gruber and Saez’s core results 
by applying their techniques to a dataset 
that is similar to the one that they used. 
My results for the 1980s closely parallel 
Gruber and Saez’s results. Applying the 
same methodology to 1990s data and to 
data from both the 1980s and 1990s com-
bined, however, yields estimated ETIs that 
are much smaller than corresponding esti-
mates for the 1980s. In fact, using Gruber 
and Saez’s preferred speciﬁ cation yields an 
estimated ETI for the 1990s that is a little 
more than half my corresponding estimate 
for the 1980s. Weighting regression results 
by income not only has an enormous 
impact on the estimates, but yields overall 
estimates that are driven by a tiny fraction 
of high–income ﬁ lers. For example, exclud-
ing the 100 most inﬂ uential observations 
(just 0.2 percent of the sample), as mea-
sured by a dfbeta test, lowers the estimated 
ETI for the 1980s from 0.37 to 0.08.5
While the dfbeta tests suggest that the 
Continuous Work History Survey (CWHS) 
estimates may be imprecise because of 
the small number of very–high–income 
observations, estimates are generally very 
similar after adding data from primarily 
high–income tax ﬁ lers to the sample. While 
the standard errors are much smaller and 
the estimates more robust with the larger 
dataset, the fact that estimates are often 
similar suggests that, despite the small 
number of very–high–income ﬁ lers, the 
CWHS may be a viable dataset for examin-
ing behavioral responses to taxation.
The larger dataset also includes addi-
tional demographic information. This 
information (age, gender, and itemization 
status), using Gruber and Saez’s preferred 
speciﬁ cation, has a positive, albeit modest, 
affect on the estimated ETI for the 1980s 
and a negligible affect on the 1990s esti-
mate. When including this information, 
the larger dataset yields an ETI for the 
1980s and 1990s combined of 0.34 with a 
t–value of over 7.5. 
Even with the larger dataset, estimates 
for the 1980s and 1990s differ greatly. The 
model with demographics and Gruber 
and Saez’s richest set of controls yields 
an estimated ETI for the 1980s of 0.43 and 
for the 1990s, 0.20.6 Including separate 
 4 In addition, when external costs or beneﬁ ts are present, assessing efﬁ ciency implications is also more complex. 
For example, suppose tax rates rise and, in response, taxable income falls, but a portion of that drop in taxable 
income comes from increased charitable contributions (and suppose those charities produce positive externali-
ties). Or suppose that a tax increase is used to ﬁ nance an underprovided public good. In such instances, the 
standard deadweight loss formula will overstate the efﬁ ciency cost of an increase in tax rates.
 5 Excluding inﬂ uential observations is not done to produce a “better” estimate, but rather to test whether a 
handful of observations may be driving the overall results. In fact, dropping observations in the manner 
described likely biases the estimates.
 6 Restricting the sample to those with over $100,000 in taxable income does not affect the ETI estimate for the 
1980s and raises the estimate for the 1990s to 0.23. However with the higher income cutoff, the estimated ETI 
for both decades combined rises by 30 percent, to 0.44.
The Elasticity of Taxable Income over the 1980s and 1990s
745
and nonlinear controls for mean rever-
sion and divergence within the income 
distribution narrows this difference, low-
ering the 1980s estimate to 0.40 and raising 
the 1990s estimate to 0.26. Additionally, 
work by Kopczuk (2005) implies that 
changes to the tax base since 1986 (IRS, 
1979–1998) could account for as much as 
14 to 29 percent of this difference. How-
ever, this still leaves the vast majority of 
the difference in estimates between the 
two time periods unexplained. 
When turning to a more encompass-
ing income measure, broad income, 
substantial variation in estimated elas-
ticities for the 1980s and 1990s is also 
observed. For the 1980s, the estimated 
broad income elasticity is 0.21. For the 
1980s, the corresponding estimate is 0.13. 
While the estimated broad income elastic-
ity is much lower for the 1980s than the 
1990s, the 1990s estimate represents a 
larger share of the corresponding taxable 
income elasticity estimate than does the 
1980s estimate. Heterogeneous income 
elasticity estimates across tax changes 
is not a new ﬁ nding. Saez (2004), using 
aggregated time–series data, ﬁ nds great 
variation in income responses to tax 
changes over years 1960 to 2000. And 
Goolsbee (1999), using repeated cross–sec-
tions of data for selected years between 
1920 and 1966, also finds substantial 
variation in estimated responses across 
tax changes.
ISSUES IN THE ANALYSIS
While taxes affect income growth, so do 
many other economic factors. Controlling 
for non–tax–induced trends in taxable 
income is a major obstacle to accurately 
estimating elasticities. The issue of non–
tax–related trends in income is given the 
most attention in this section because the 
approach used to control for those trends 
represents the most novel aspect of the 
model employed in this study—a model 
developed by Gruber and Saez (2002). The 
approach also takes into account other 
factors, such as mean reversion, tax–rate 
endogeneity, institutional changes (which 
often coincide with changes in the rate 
structure), and differences between tran-
sitory (or temporary) fluctuations and 
permanent (or longer–term) responses. 
(For a discussion of these issues and the 
related literature, see Giertz (2004) and 
Slemrod (1998).)
Controlling for Exogenous Trends in 
Income
The centerpiece of Gruber and Saez’s 
approach is its controls for non–tax–
related heterogeneous shifts in income 
distribution and mean reversion. Over the 
past 30 years, the distribution of reported 
income has widened. In fact, that trend 
accelerated in the 1980s, especially at the 
top of the distribution.7 Because people 
with the highest income pay a dispro-
portionate share of taxes—the top one 
percent pay approximately one–third of 
all federal income taxes—their behavior 
is especially important (see Internal Rev-
enue Service (2004)). Not fully accounting 
for the portion of that income growth 
that is unrelated to tax policy can result 
in large biases. For example, the 1980s 
cuts in marginal tax rates were greatest 
at the top of the income distribution and, 
thus, inversely correlated with the great 
income growth at the top of the distribu-
tion. If the exogenous (non–tax–related) 
portion of that income growth is not fully 
accounted for, that trend will bias ETI 
estimates upward. Because this income 
 7 According to Piketty and Saez (2003), the share of income reported by the top ten percent of ﬁ lers rose by 
more than a third, from 32.9 percent in 1979 to 41.4 percent in 1998; two–thirds of that increase went to the 
top one percent of taxpayers. The share of income reported by the top one–half of one percent more than 
doubled, the share reported by the top one–tenth of one percent nearly tripled, and the share reported by the 
top one–hundredth of one percent more than quadrupled.
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trend has been irregular, distributional 
changes in years without tax changes may 
not provide useful measures of exogenous 
shifts that occur during periods with tax 
changes.
Although changes to the income dis-
tribution are widely documented and 
theories such as heterogeneous (and 
diverging) returns to education and expe-
rience help explain the phenomenon, the 
underlying driving factors are not well 
understood, nor are the year–to–year 
deviations from that trend.8 The fact that 
the exogenous–income trend has persisted 
through periods of both increases and 
decreases in the level and progressivity of 
income tax rates suggests that it is, in large 
part, not a direct response to tax changes. 
Furthermore, Saez and Veall (2005) ﬁ nd an 
income trend at the top of the Canadian 
income distribution that closely paral-
lels that in the U.S.—despite a different 
pattern of tax changes in Canada with 
much more modest reductions in mar-
ginal tax rates. That notwithstanding, the 
possibility that the phenomenon results 
from a longer–run and more–nuanced 
response to tax changes cannot entirely 
be ruled out. Note that the progressivity 
(especially within the top one percent of 
the income distribution)9 of both the U.S. 
and Canadian tax systems has declined 
substantially since 1970, as the concen-
tration of income held by this group has 
risen substantially in both countries. 
By contrast, tax progressivity at the top 
of the French income distribution has 
remained stable (or possibly increased), 
while the income concentration at the top 
of the French income distribution too has 
remained relatively stable (Piketty and 
Saez, 2007).
Controlling for Mean Reversion
Mean reversion also complicates estima-
tion. Over a person’s lifetime, income often 
follows a general path, with many ﬂ uctua-
tions. After income has been particularly 
high or low, it will often revert to a more 
normal path. That reversion is especially 
pronounced at the tails of the distribution. 
People at the high end of the income distri-
bution are often not there for long, and will 
likely have a substantial drop in income 
that is unrelated to tax policy. At the other 
extreme, students will often have large 
increases in income when they enter the 
workforce. Estimating the ETI without fully 
controlling for mean reversion will erro-
neously count non–tax–related increases 
(by people below their lifetime path) and 
decreases (by those above their lifetime 
path) in taxable income as responses to 
changes in tax rates. Those factors bias ETI 
estimates in opposite directions, depending 
on whether tax rates are raised or lowered, 
but there is no reason to believe the biases 
will cancel each other out.
Research into the ETI is also compli-
cated by the fact that the ETI appears 
to vary with income, rising as income 
increases.10 If so, a single overall elasticity 
will not be applicable when considering 
the impact of rate changes that target only 
part of the income distribution or that 
differ across the distribution. In addition, 
a meaningful average overall estimated 
ETI must take into account the correla-
tion between income and the elasticities. 
The average response of all ﬁ lers may be 
very different from an income–weighted 
estimate that reﬂ ects how taxable income 
(and to a lesser extent tax revenue) as a 
whole will respond.
 8 For possible explanations driving the divergence at the top of the income distribution, see Lemieux (2006).
 9 That is, within the top one percent of income, taxes as a share of income continue to increase with income; 
however, for 1970 the increase was very steep, whereas today it is modest.
10 People with higher incomes generally have more opportunities to respond to tax changes (see Saez (2004)). 
They generally itemize their tax returns, rely less on wage and salary income, and have more control over the 
timing and source of their income than do other groups. People with more modest incomes can alter their 
labor supply, but may have few other alternatives for altering their taxable income.
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DATA AND METHODS
This paper uses data on individual tax 
returns from the Statistics of Income (SOI) 
for years 1979 through 2001. The SOI is 
a stratiﬁ ed random sample of tax ﬁ lers, 
compiled by the Internal Revenue Service, 
and includes all information reported on 
ﬁ lers’ tax returns, plus additional demo-
graphic information. In addition to the full 
SOI, the Continuous Work History Survey 
(CWHS), a conﬁ dential version of the data 
used by Gruber and Saez (2002), is used 
for the replication phase of the paper, as 
well as for some of the sensitivity analysis. 
The CWHS is a subset of ﬁ lers from the 
SOI who are followed from year to year. 
Although the CWHS contains detailed 
and accurate information, it is deﬁ cient 
in two important respects. First, although 
the CWHS sample is quite large (for some 
years, more than 20,000), relatively few 
returns are from the very top of the income 
distribution. If high–income taxpayers 
dominate an estimate, that estimate using 
the CWHS will depend heavily on just a 
few ﬁ lers. This shortcoming of the CWHS 
can be overcome by moving to the full SOI, 
which heavily over–samples high–income 
ﬁ lers. Second, the CWHS (and the full SOI) 
includes only people who ﬁ le returns and 
are listed as the primary ﬁ lers. Thus, attri-
tion is an issue.
While selection into the CWHS is 
designed to be random, selection into 
the full SOI is conditional on several fac-
tors, including income. More speciﬁ cally, 
each individual is assigned a number at 
random, which does not change from 
year to year. For each year, tax returns are 
separated into strata based on AGI and the 
forms and schedules used by the ﬁ lers. 
Sampling probabilities vary by strata and 
reach 100 percent for very–high–income 
filers. The returns in each stratum are 
sorted by the randomly assigned values 
and the strata sampling probability is 
used to determine the cut point for inclu-
sion into the SOI. Because the individual 
maintains the same random value over 
time and because the stratum sampling 
probability simply determines the cut 
point for inclusion in the sample, once 
included in the SOI, an individual is auto-
matically included in future years if his 
income remains the same or if his income 
increases because this would either put 
him in the same stratum or in a stratum 
with a higher sampling probability, thus 
maintaining or lowering the cut point 
for inclusion. Therefore, an individual 
observed in the base year is much more 
likely to be observed in the future year if 
his income rises than if it falls. In fact, the 
probability that one is observed in two 
different years is simply the minimum 
of the strata sampling probabilities for 
the two years. This raises the potential 
for spurious correlation between the 
dependent variable (ln(incomet/incomet+1)) 
and the independent variables, including 
the tax variable. To avoid this possibility, 
(paired) observations from the full SOI 
are weighted by the reciprocal of their 
probability of appearing in the sample.11 
This strategy is discussed in Imbens and 
Lancaster (1996) and in Auten and Carroll 
(1999), who employ this strategy using 
similar data.12
This paper follows Gruber and Saez 
(2002) in comparing behavior over three–
year intervals, using only people who 
ﬁ led tax returns in both the base (or ini-
tial) year and the third subsequent year. 
The overall SOI sample includes nearly 
700,000 paired observations, with over 
218,000 from the CWHS. For base years 
1979 to 1998, the CWHS sample includes 
just 113 returns with taxable income 
11 For paired observation, the sampling probability is simply the minimum of the sampling probabilities for the 
two observations used in constructing the pair.
12 Additionally, income–weighted results for the full SOI are produced by simply multiplying all weights by 
income.
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greater than $1,000,000, while the full 
SOI includes 113,673 such returns.13 (The 
CWHS includes just four ﬁ lers with tax-
able income over $5,000,000, while the full 
SOI includes 21,365.)
Income measures are deﬁ ned accord-
ing to 1990 law. Over time, both tax rates 
and the deﬁ nition of taxable income itself 
change. Deductions are permitted in some 
years and not others. The deﬁ nition of 
income can affect responses to changes 
in tax rates (Slemrod and Kopczuk, 
2002). Furthermore, estimated responses 
of income to changes in tax rates may be 
spurious if the deﬁ nition of income also 
changes between the two periods and a 
concurrent (as opposed to constant–law) 
deﬁ nition of income is used (Slemrod, 
1996).14 For the 1980s and 1990s, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) presents the 
biggest obstacle to creating a constant law 
deﬁ nition of income. Because deductions 
and exclusion were more generous pre 
TRA 86, it is easier to construct a constant 
law measure based on post–TRA–86 
law.15 Imposing 1990 law on pre–TRA–86 
returns generally results in larger taxable 
income measures than under pre–TRA–86 
law. Additionally, it is assumed that these 
ﬁ lers would have opted for the standard 
deduction (at the 1990 level, but adjusted 
for inflation) instead of their itemized 
deductions, if their itemized deduc-
tions based on 1990 law are less than 
the standard deduction. As with Gruber 
and Saez, income measures are adjusted 
by the growth in broad income, where 
broad income equals total income minus 
realized capital gains and Social Security 
beneﬁ ts, using 1990 as the base.16 More 
speciﬁ cally, 
broad income = AGI – capital gains 
– supplemental (Schedule E) income 
or loss + dividends excluded from AGI 
+ unemployment compensation not 
included in AGI + Keogh and traditional 
IRA contributions + forfeited interest 
penalties + alimony paid.
As with most studies in this literature, 
capital gains are excluded from the 
analysis because they are only observed 
when they are realized, and not when 
they accrue. Social Security beneﬁ ts are 
excluded because they are not observed in 
all years. Schedule E income is excluded 
because it can change dramatically from 
the shifting of income between Subchapter 
S and Subchapter C corporations. Sub-
chapter S income is reported on Schedule 
E, whereas Subchapter C income is gener-
ally not observed at the individual level.17 
(Additionally, Schedule E income was 
affected by changes to both depreciation 
rules and passive loss rules.) The other 
income measure, taxable income, equals 
broad income less the value of exemptions 
and the greater of the standard or itemized 
deductions.18
13 This is based on incomes in 1992 dollars, as adjusted by rates of growth in broad income.
14 For example, before TRA 86, 40 percent of capital gains were included in taxable income. Post TRA 86, all capital 
gains were included. Thus, even if capital gains realizations remained unchanged by TRA 86, a concurrent 
income deﬁ nition would show taxable income from capital gains rising by 150 percent.
15 Information on many of the sources of pre–TRA–86 deductions and exclusions are not reported after 1986. 
However, many of the post–TRA–86 deductions and exclusions were reported on (or can be imputed from) 
pre–reform returns.
16 The adjustment for broad–income growth is analogous to adjustments that transform nominal dollars into 
real dollars. Thus, for this paper, each individual’s reported income is divided by the ratio of average broad 
income in 1990 over the average broad income in the year of the observation.
17 This issue is discussed in more detail later.
18 Eligible deductions from AGI include: moving expenses, IRA and Keogh payments, medical expenses exceeding 
7.5 percent of AGI, state and local income taxes, real estate and property taxes, mortgage interest and pay-
ments for deductible points, charitable contributions, net casualty deduction, as well as other miscellaneous 
deductions.
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The sample includes only those with 
broad income greater than $10,000 in 
the base year and positive income in the 
future year. Without those restrictions, 
the SOI sample is about 20 percent larger, 
and the CWHS sample is about 25 percent 
larger. Mean taxable base–year income, 
after adjusting by the growth rate in 
broad income, is $28,311 for the CWHS 
sample and $26,961 for the full SOI. For 
broad income, these numbers are $45,065 
and $43,581, respectively (see Table 1).19 
In nominal dollars, mean taxable income 
ranges from $10,739 in 1979 to $25,308 
in 1998 for the CWHS; the correspond-
ing means for broad income range from 
$17,442 to $43,289. Individual marginal 
tax rates (both state and federal) are 
imputed using the Congressional Budget 
Ofﬁ ce’s internal tax calculators.20
The CWHS sample is very similar to 
data used by Gruber and Saez, but dif-
fers in several respects. First, Gruber and 
Saez use a publicly available version of 
the CWHS, which is slightly modiﬁ ed in 
order to protect the identity of taxpayers 
in the sample. Second, Gruber and Saez’s 
sample ends in 1990, whereas my sample 
extends to 2001. Third, Gruber and Saez 
use the National Bureau of Economic 
Research’s (NBER) TAXSIM model to 
impute their federal and state marginal 
tax rates, whereas I use the Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ ce’s internal tax calculators. 
Because Gruber and Saez did not 
use the full SOI, they did not need to 
employ the weighting strategy discussed 
above. They did weight their results by 
income, though. Weighting by income is 
intended to produce estimates reﬂ ective 
of the change in total reported taxable 
(or broad) income, which relates directly 
to the change in income–tax revenues. If 
responses were homogeneous throughout 
the reported income distribution, weight-
ing would not affect the results. But, as a 
number of studies, including Gruber and 
Saez, have found, the ETI varies by income 
and is generally much larger for the 
highest–income ﬁ lers. Weighting should 
produce estimates that are more indicative 
of overall responses, but, at the same time, 
the importance of weighting suggests that 
the model ﬁ t may be poor.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS:  CWHS VERSUS SOI
Paired Observationsa
Paired Observations 1980s
Paired Observations 1990s
Returns with Base Year Taxable Income Greater than:
 $1,000,000 
 $5,000,000 
Mean Base Year Taxable Incomeb
Mean Baseyear Broad Incomeb
Mean Federal Tax Rate
Mean State Tax Rate
Mean Net–of–Tax Rate
Mean Federal Tax Liabilityb
Mean State Tax Liabilityb
CWHS
193,809
54,136
139,673
113
4
$28,311
$45,065
21
4
75
6,246
1,361
SOI
699,724
250,140
449,584
113,673
21,365
$26,961
$43,581
21
4
75
5,720
1,241
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data from 1979 to 2001. Filers with less than $10,000 of broad 
income are excluded.
aSample sizes are for the taxable income regressions.
bIncome and tax liabilities are expressed in 1992 dollars, as adjusted by the growth in broad income. Averages 
for the SOI are weighted to reﬂ ect the population of tax ﬁ lers.
19 SOI averages are weighted to reﬂ ect a random sample. Without such weighting, the corresponding means are 
$641,978 for taxable income and $818,212 for broad income.
20 Jon Bakija designed the state tax calculator used by the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ ce (see Bakija (2006)).
NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL
750
The methodology follows directly 
from Gruber and Saez (2002). The income 
growth rate equals 
ln ln
income
income
taxratet
t
t
t+ +⎛⎝⎜
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The dependent variable is log of income 
in the future year (incomet+3) divided by 
income in the base year (incomet), where 
the future year is three years after the 
base. (The key independent variable 
equals the log of the net–of–tax rate in the 
future year divided by the net–of–tax rate 
in the base year.) To avoid endogeneity 
between the tax rate and income, a ﬁ rst 
stage regression is run to produce and 
exogenous measure of the log change in 
the net–of–tax rate.22 The coefﬁ cient on 
that variable, ξ, represents the ETI. Con-
trol variables include year–ﬁ xed effects, 
dummies for marital status (mars), and a 
ten–piece spline of the log of base–year 
income. The spline is intended to control 
for mean reversion and for non–tax–
related income trends that have differed 
across the reported income distribution 
in recent decades. Alternative speciﬁ ca-
tions employed by Gruber and Saez and 
in this paper include a model with the 
log of base–year income in place of the 
spline and a speciﬁ cation that excludes the 
income control altogether. Additionally 
and following Kopczuk (2005), speciﬁ ca-
tions that include separate controls for 
mean reversion and non–tax–related 
income trends are explored. This is done 
by including explanatory variables based 
on one–year lagged income and the differ-
ence between base–year income and the 
one–year lag as separate variables (and 
in place of the log of base–year income). 
(Gruber and Saez also include a variable 
to separate the income effect from the 
substitution effect. They conclude that the 
income effect is not important and, thus, 
exclude it from most of their analysis.) In 
addition to extending the years of data 
and adding more high–income ﬁ lers, I also 
add a richer set of demographic informa-
tion (demog), including age, gender, and 
itemization status.
RESULTS
This section begins by replicating 
Gruber and Saez’s approach for the 
1980s using the CWHS sample and then 
compares the two sets of results. Next, 
the same methodology is applied to the 
1990s and to the full period, spanning 
1979 to 2001.23 After a discussion of those 
results, the importance of income–weight-
ing regressions is examined. Next, a dfbeta 
test is conducted and the sensitivity of the 
estimated ETIs to the exclusion of hand-
fuls of the most inﬂ uential observations 
is examined. 
The CWHS analysis is followed by 
results for each of the periods from the full 
SOI. The full SOI is also used to examine 
the inﬂ uence that several different factors 
have on the estimates. First, the affect of 
additional demographics is examined. 
Second, the model is altered to include 
21 Note that, for simplicity, subscripts denoting the individual are omitted here.
22 The instrument is constructed by inﬂ ating base–year income by the growth in mean broad income over the 
three–year interval. Next, the tax calculator computes counterfactual tax rates based on the inﬂ ated income 
measure. Finally, two–stage least squares (2SLS) is employed, where, in the ﬁ rst stage, the log change in the 
actual net–of–tax rate is regressed against the counterfactual (or imputed) log change in the net–of–tax rate, 
along with the other independent variables.
23 Estimates for the 1980s tax changes use data from 1979 to 1990. Because each observation contains information 
from the base year and information on the same ﬁ ler three years later, base years for the 1980s range from 1979 
to 1987. Estimates for the 1990s tax changes use data from 1988 to 2001, with base years ranging from 1988 to 
1998.
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separate controls for mean reversion and 
divergence within the income distribution. 
Third, the model is estimated for responses 
due to variation in federal tax rates and 
then again for variation in state tax rates. 
Finally, the ETI is re–estimated for a sample 
that includes only high–income ﬁ lers.24
Replicating Gruber and Saez
Each pair of the six columns of Table 
2 reports Gruber and Saez’s estimated 
elasticities for the 1980s (for broad income 
and taxable income) under the follow-
ing speciﬁ cations: with no controls for 
exogenous income trends, with the log of 
base–year income as a control, and with 
a ten–piece spline of log income (Gruber 
and Saez’s preferred speciﬁ cation). My 
comparable estimates for the same period 
are presented in Table 3. Despite using a 
slightly different data set and different 
marginal tax rate calculators, the two 
sets of results are quite similar. Estimated 
with no control for base–year income, 
the elasticities are negative, which is 
inconsistent with theoretical predictions. 
Adding the log of base–year income to 
the model results in an estimated ETI of 
just above 0.6 and a substantially smaller 
broad–income elasticity of 0.17. Replac-
ing the log of base–year income with the 
ten–piece spline yields an estimated ETI in 
the neighborhood of 0.4 and a correspond-
ing estimated elasticity of broad income of 
0.12.25 The fact that the estimated elastici-
ties for broad income are so much lower 
than the corresponding ETI estimates 
suggests that a substantial portion of the 
taxable–income response may come via 
deductions and exemptions. Another 
contributing factor may be that the 
denominator for the broad–income cal-
culation is larger, by deﬁ nition; thus, for 
an identical dollar change, the estimated 
broad–income elasticity will be smaller 
than the corresponding ETI estimate. 
Smaller broad–income elasticities are con-
sistent with Kopczuk’s (2005) ﬁ nding that 
income responses are a function of the tax 
base and that the greater is the availability 
of exemptions and deductions, the lower 
is the cost of responding to tax changes 
and, hence, the larger is the response.
CWHS Results for the 1990s
The same methodology generates esti-
mated ETIs for the 1990s that are much 
smaller than those for the 1980s and not 
statistically signiﬁ cant, despite a sample 
size of nearly 140,000 (see Table 4). Gruber 
and Saez’s preferred speciﬁ cation, which 
includes a ten–piece spline, yields an esti-
TABLE 2
INCOME–WEIGHTED ESTIMATES FOR THE 1980s 
(Gruber and Saez (2002) Results)
none log income 10–piece spline
Broad 
Income
–0.30
(0.120)
69,129
Taxable 
Income
–0.462
(0.194)
59,199
Broad 
Income
0.17
(0.106)
69,129
Taxable 
Income
0.611
(0.144)
59,199
Broad 
Income
0.12
(0.106)
69,129
Taxable 
Income
0.40
(0.144)
59,199
Notes: This is a partial reproduction of Table 4 from Gruber and Saez (2002).
Income Controls:
Elasticity
Observations
24 Estimates throughout this section are based on 2SLS, where, as discussed in the previous section, counterfactual 
net–of–tax rates are used as instruments for the actual rates—since the actual rate is endogenous. Throughout 
the analyses, instruments in the ﬁ rst–stage regressions show strong statistical signiﬁ cance (both as measured 
by F statistics and by t statistics for the estimated coefﬁ cients on the counterfactual tax variables).
25 As with Gruber and Saez, when including a ten–piece spline, broad income elasticities are never statistically 
different from zero (at the ﬁ ve percent level).
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mated ETI of 0.20, or slightly more than 
half the size of my estimate for the 1980s. 
Replacing the log of base–year income 
with a spline has little impact on the esti-
mated ETI for the 1990s, but reduces the 
estimate for the 1980s by more than 40 
percent (from 0.63 to 0.37). Note that con-
trolling for changes in income inequality 
may be more complex for the 1990s than 
for the 1980s, since top incomes, while 
trending upward, show much greater 
variation in the 1990s.
TABLE 3
REPLICATED RESULTS FOR THE 1980s
none log income 10–piece spline
Broad 
Income
–0.248
(0.113)
0.003
(0.012)
–0.016
(0.013)
–0.091
(0.014)
60,092
Taxable 
Income
–0.369
(0.111)
–0.079
(0.016)
–0.072
(0.017)
0.008
(0.018)
54,136
Broad 
Income
0.166
(0.113)
0.064
(0.016)
–0.014
(0.014)
–0.100
(0.018)
0.940
(0.187)
60,092
Taxable 
Income
0.625
(0.146)
0.043
(0.022)
–0.063
(0.021)
–0.200
(0.018)
1.982
(0.180)
54,136
Broad 
Income
0.124
(0.110)
0.073
(0.015)
–0.014
(0.014)
0.000
(0.000)
–0.892
(0.219)
–0.205
(0.052)
–0.140
(0.053)
–0.217
(0.059)
–0.068
(0.059)
–0.122
(0.063)
–0.133
(0.068)
–0.019
(0.100)
–0.086
(0.048)
0.657
(0.139)
60,092
Taxable 
Income
0.373
(0.160)
0.078
(0.021)
–0.048
(0.021)
–0.818
(0.033)
–0.567
(0.040)
–0.376
(0.053)
–0.409
(0.063)
–0.220
(0.074)
–0.224
(0.083)
–0.260
(0.089)
–0.218
(0.079)
–0.278
(0.085)
–0.074
(0.039)
7.422
(0.257)
54,136
Income Controls:
Elasticity
Married
Single
ln(income)
 Spline: decile 1
  decile 2
  decile 3
  decile 4
  decile 5
  decile 6
  decile 7
  decile 8
  decile 9
  decile 10
Constant
Observations
Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for 1979 to 1990. Estimates are from 2SLS 
regressions. The income range is $10,000 and above.  Regressions are weighted by income. All regressions include 
dummies for marital status and dummies for each base year.  Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) 
are in parentheses.
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TABLE 4
INCOME–WEIGHTED CWHS ESTIMATES FOR BOTH DECADES
none log income 10–piece spline
Broad 
Income
0.475
(0.105)
–0.015
(0.008)
–0.039
(0.010)
–0.067
(0.011)
158,679
Taxable 
Income
0.738
(0.168)
–0.122
(0.014)
–0.090
(0.016)
–0.033
(0.019)
139,673
Broad 
Income
0.184
(0.094)
0.087
(0.011)
–0.014
(0.010)
–0.099
(0.010)
0.952
(0.103)
158,679
Taxable 
Income
0.177
(0.137)
0.063
(0.017)
–0.042
(0.017)
–0.162
(0.013)
1.588
(0.134)
139,673
Broad 
Income
0.148
(0.097)
0.08
(0.009)
–0.014
(0.010)
0.00
(0.000)
0.00
(0.000)
–0.243
(0.045)
–0.186
(0.030)
–0.109
(0.030)
–0.135
(0.034)
–0.039
(0.035)
–0.172
(0.036)
0.097
(0.049)
–0.122
(0.021)
0.128
(0.019)
158,679
Taxable 
Income
0.195
(0.144)
0.086
(0.015)
–0.027
(0.017)
–0.827
(0.021)
–0.504
(0.024)
–0.408
(0.031)
–0.293
(0.039)
–0.27
(0.046)
–0.277
(0.046)
–0.168
(0.049)
–0.232
(0.057)
0.067
(0.071)
–0.155
(0.028)
7.313
(0.156)
139,673
Income Controls:
Elasticity
Married
Single
ln(income)
 Spline: decile 1
  decile 2
  decile 3
  decile 4
  decile 5
  decile 6
  decile 7
  decile 8
  decile 9
  decile 10
Constant
Observations
Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for 1979 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS 
regressions. The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by income. All regressions include 
dummies for marital status and dummies for each base year.  Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) 
are in parentheses.
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TABLE 5
INCOME–WEIGHTED CWHS ESTIMATES FOR BOTH DECADES
none log income 10–piece spline
Broad 
Income
0.121
(0.077)
–0.01
(0.007)
–0.028
(0.008)
–(0.090)
0.012
218,771
Taxable 
Income
0.192
(0.103)
–0.113
(0.011)
–0.083
(0.012)
(0.027)
0.015
193,809
Broad 
Income
0.174
(0.078)
0.082
(0.010)
–0.012
(0.009)
–0.099
(0.009)
(0.917)
0.096
218,771
Taxable 
Income
0.305
(0.099)
0.056
(0.015)
–0.047
(0.014)
–0.165
(0.013)
(1.638)
0.129
193,809
Broad 
Income
0.149
(0.080)
0.079
(0.008)
–0.012
(0.009)
0.00
(0.000)
0.00
(0.000)
–0.266
(0.031)
–0.167
(0.025)
–0.122
(0.026)
–0.131
(0.028)
–0.069
(0.029)
–0.151
(0.032)
0.074
(0.048)
–0.116
(0.020)
0.094
(0.015)
218,771
Taxable 
Income
0.298
(0.100)
0.085
(0.013)
–0.032
(0.014)
–0.817
(0.017)
–0.524
(0.021)
–0.385
(0.027)
–0.334
(0.033)
–0.265
(0.039)
–0.25
(0.041)
–0.196
(0.043)
–0.253
(0.047)
0.01
(0.065)
–0.14
(0.026)
7.301
(0.133)
193,809
Income Controls:
Elasticity
Married
Single
ln(income)
 Spline: decile 1
  decile 2
  decile 3
  decile 4
  decile 5
  decile 6
  decile 7
  decile 8
  decile 9
  decile 10
Constant
Observations
Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work History Survey data for 1979 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS 
regressions. The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by income. All regressions include 
dummies for marital status and dummies for each base year.  Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) 
are in parentheses.
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Although the ETI estimates are much 
smaller for the 1990s than for the 1980s, the 
corresponding estimated broad–income 
elasticities are slightly larger (although 
still not statistically different from zero). 
Including the spline yields an estimated 
broad–income elasticity for the 1990s of 
about 0.15, compared with 0.12 for the 
1980s (see Table 3 and Table 4).
The ETI estimates for the different time 
periods suggest that mean reversion at the 
top of the income distribution (i.e., falling 
incomes) dominates the secular income 
trend (of rising top income shares) and 
that this may result in estimates that are 
biased in different directions depending 
on whether tax rates are raised or low-
ered. The likelihood or degree of this bias 
depends on the base–year income con-
trols included in the regression. Without 
base–year income controls, estimates for 
the 1980s are much smaller—in fact, well 
below zero—than with controls, but, for 
the 1990s, the opposite is true: estimates 
without income controls are much larger 
than those with controls. Mean reversion at 
the top of the income distribution implies 
drops in income for the 1980s that are 
negatively correlated with the net–of–tax 
rate, which is rising. For the 1990s, similar 
drops in income are positively correlated 
with the net–of–tax rate, which is falling. 
People at the top of the income distribu-
tion have a relatively high probability of 
experiencing a substantial drop in income, 
but people with moderate incomes have 
only a small probability of experiencing 
tremendous income gains needed to push 
them to the top of the distribution. 
CWHS Results for the Full Sample Period
Not surprisingly, the same techniques 
applied to the full CWHS sample (from 
1979 to 2001) generally result in estimated 
ETIs that are smaller than those for the 
1980s and larger than those for the 1990s. 
The speciﬁ cation with the ten–piece spline 
yields an estimated ETI of 0.30, or slightly 
higher than the average of the estimates 
for the 1980s and 1990s. The speciﬁ cation 
with the log of base–year income produces 
an estimated ETI of 0.31, which is higher 
than the 1990s estimate of 0.18 but is only 
half the corresponding 1980s estimate of 
0.63. Once again, estimated broad–income 
elasticities are stable: 0.15 with the spline 
and 0.17 (and statistically signiﬁ cant) with 
the log of income control. 
Weighting and Sensitivity to Sample 
Selection 
With many estimation techniques, a 
small number of outliers can exert a heavy 
inﬂ uence on the estimated coefﬁ cients; in 
such case the estimates may not be indica-
tive of the behavior of much of the sample. 
As a case in point, Slemrod (1996) ﬁ nds 
evidence suggesting that just one taxpayer 
may have been responsible for a substantial 
portion of several of the estimates reported 
by Feldstein (1995). That possibility seems 
remote when regressions are unweighted 
and include well over 50,000 observations. 
With income–weighting, however, that is 
not necessarily the case. With income–
weighting, large numbers of taxpayers 
with lower reported incomes might exert 
much less inﬂ uence on the overall results 
than might a few very–high–income ﬁ lers. 
In fact, re–estimating Tables 4–6 without 
using income weights dramatically low-
TABLE 6
THE EFFECT OF EXCLUDING THE MOST 
INFLUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS OF INCOME–
WEIGHTED ESTIMATES FOR THE 1980sa
Dropped
Observations
0
10
25
50
100
Sample Size
54,136
54,126
54,111
54,086
54,036
Estimated ETI
0.373
0.235
0.174
0.116
0.084
Notes: Estimates are based on Continuous Work His-
tory Survey data for years 1979 to 1990.
aEstimates are based on the specification with a 
10–piece spline. Observations are dropped based on 
the size of their impact on the estimated ETI and as 
measured by a dfbeta test.
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ers the estimated ETIs for all time periods, 
suggesting that overall responsiveness is 
negligible.26 In order to further test the 
sensitivity of my estimates to very inﬂ u-
ential observations, I exclude as many 
as 100 observations that most affect the 
income–weighted estimates.
A dfbeta test for the 1980s sample mea-
sures the inﬂ uence of each observation on 
the overall ETI estimate. For each obser-
vation, the dfbeta test calculates the dif-
ference between the estimated coefﬁ cient 
with and without that observation. Tax-
able–income elasticities for the 1980s are 
re–estimated based on the speciﬁ cation 
with the ten–piece spline and excluding 
the observations with the largest dfbetas 
(in absolute value). Observations are 
excluded not to improve the ETI estimates, 
but rather to test the model’s sensitivity 
to small numbers of observations. Drop-
ping the ten most inﬂ uential observations 
reduces the estimated ETI by more than 
35 percent, to 0.24. Dropping the 25 most 
inﬂ uential observations further lowers 
the estimated ETI to 0.17, more than 50 
percent below the initial estimate. Exclud-
ing the 100 most inﬂ uential observations 
(0.2 percent of the sample) lowers the esti-
mated ETI to 0.08, 77 percent lower than 
the initial estimate (see Table 6). Thus, 
despite the large sample size, income 
weighting results in estimates that are 
highly sensitive to just a few observations. 
For the most part, the most inﬂ uential 
observations are taxpayers with very 
high taxable incomes who also report 
large changes in taxable income between 
the base year and the future year. Again 
note that dropping observations is likely 
biasing the estimates and that the purpose 
of this exercise is not to produce a better 
estimate, but to show that the overall esti-
mates may be heavily dependent on a few 
observations. This result is not especially 
surprising because just a small slice of 
the CWHS sample is used to represent 
the segment of top income earners who 
are responsible for a very large share of 
overall income and tax revenues.
Results from the Full SOI 
The analysis thus far calls into ques-
tion the level of precision with which the 
CWHS–based taxable income responses 
are estimated. Despite a sample size of 
well over 50,000 for the 1980s, estimated 
ETIs are extremely sensitive to a tiny 
number of the most inﬂ uential observa-
tions. Furthermore, despite a sample size 
of close to 140,000, estimated ETIs for the 
1990s are far from statistically signiﬁ cant. 
Although sample sizes are quite large, the 
number of really high–income ﬁ lers is very 
small. This, plus income–weighting the 
regressions, results in coefﬁ cients that are 
driven by a small number of observations. 
Additionally, for the 1990s a large fraction 
of the observations experience no change 
in tax rates because the 1990 and 1993 tax 
acts only changed tax rates for those in 
the upper tax brackets. Fortunately, this 
shortcoming of the CWHS can be over-
come by turning to the full SOI, which, as 
discussed in the previous section, heavily 
over–samples high–income ﬁ lers.
Given the sensitivity of the CWHS esti-
mates, it is surprising that, for the most part, 
estimated ETIs from the full SOI are quite 
similar to the CWHS estimates.27 For the 
1980s, the estimate ETI is 0.43 (versus 0.37 
with the CWHS) with a t–value of over 5.2 
(see Table 7). For the 1990s, the estimated 
ETI is 0.20, almost exactly the same as the 
CWHS estimate, but with a t–value of 3.3 
(versus 1.35 with the CWHS) (see Table 8). 
For both decades combined, the estimated 
ETI is 0.34 (versus 0.30 with the CWHS) 
with a t–value of 7.5 (see Table 9).
26 However, including the log of base–year income, instead of a spline, results in estimated ETIs that are much 
larger and similar to those from the identically speciﬁ ed income–weighted model.
27 The full SOI estimates also include the richer set of demographic variables, but exclude state dummies. Includ-
ing state dummies does very little to the estimates.
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TABLE 7
FULL SOI TAXABLE AND BROAD–INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE 1980s
No Income Controls Base–Year Income Controls Spline Income Controls
Broad
Income
–0.033
(0.036)
0.079
(0.008)
0.014
(0.008)
0.045
(0.003)
–0.011
(0.001)
0.008
(0.000)
0.007
(0.001)
–0.004
(0.004)
–0.73
(0.054)
248,940
Taxable 
Income
–0.001
(0.059)
0.011
(0.011)
–0.012
(0.012)
0.072
(0.004)
–0.017
(0.001)
0.011
(0.001)
0.007
(0.001)
–0.039
(0.006)
–1.12
(0.073)
250,140
Broad 
Income
0.309
(0.048)
0.118
(0.008)
0.023
(0.008)
0.056
(0.004)
–0.013
(0.001)
0.009
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
–0.055
(0.005)
–0.091
(0.005)
0.049
(0.070)
248,940
Taxable 
Income
0.648
(0.081)
0.069
(0.012)
0.007
(0.012)
0.086
(0.005)
–0.019
(0.001)
0.012
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
–0.117
(0.008)
–0.145
(0.008)
0.111
(0.098)
250,140
Broad
Income
0.210
(0.048)
0.140
(0.009)
0.031
(0.008)
0.065
(0.004)
–0.015
(0.001)
0.010
(0.001)
0.005
(0.001)
–0.069
(0.005)
–0.918
(0.186)
–0.219
(0.017)
–0.169
(0.018)
–0.123
(0.022)
–0.142
(0.022)
–0.041
(0.027)
–0.004
(0.024)
–0.033
(0.041)
–0.066
(0.054)
–0.137
(0.035)
7.738
(1.732)
248,940
Taxable 
Income
0.425
(0.081)
0.096
(0.012)
0.028
(0.012)
0.10
(0.005)
–0.022
(0.001)
0.014
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)
–0.126
(0.008)
–0.610
(0.016)
–0.235
(0.018)
–0.213
(0.025)
–0.168
(0.030)
–0.176
(0.033)
–0.021
(0.034)
–0.069
(0.031)
0.006
(0.054)
–0.136
(0.100)
–0.131
(0.069)
4.119
(0.157)
250,140
ln(mtrt+3/mtrt)
Married
Single
Age
Age Squared/10
Age Cubed/100
sex
itemzer_base
ln(income)
decile 1
decile 2
decile 3
decile 4
decile 5
decile 6
decile 7
decile 8
decile 9
decile 10
Constant
Observations
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1979 to 1990. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. 
The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and 
by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
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TABLE 8
FULL SOI TAXABLE AND BROAD–INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE 1990s
No Income Controls Base–Year Income Controls Spline Income Controls
Broad
Income
0.478
(0.044)
0.091
(0.010)
0.017
(0.009)
0.016
(0.006)
–0.006
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
0.012
(0.005)
–0.218
(0.096)
323,776 
Taxable 
Income
0.745
(0.071)
0.013
(0.011)
–0.024
(0.011)
0.028
(0.007)
–0.008
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
–0.023
(0.005)
–0.304
(0.104)
449,584 
Broad 
Income
0.133
(0.038)
0.139
(0.009)
0.029
(0.009)
0.028
(0.006)
–0.007
(0.001)
0.005
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
–0.096
(0.006)
–0.107
(0.004)
0.776
(0.100)
323,776 
Taxable 
Income
0.144
(0.058)
0.082
(0.010)
0.002
(0.010)
0.043
(0.006)
–0.010
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
–0.002
(0.001)
–0.127
(0.006)
–0.120
(0.004)
0.720
(0.103)
449,584 
Broad
Income
0.125
(0.037)
0.137
(0.010)
0.029
(0.009)
0.028
(0.006)
–0.007
(0.001)
0.005
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
–0.083
(0.006)
–0.025
(0.022)
–0.19
(0.021)
–0.102
(0.018)
–0.153
(0.020)
–0.075
(0.020)
–0.033
(0.013)
–0.094
(0.015)
–0.139
(0.026)
–0.311
(0.064)
–0.095
(0.046)
0.080
(0.100)
 
323,776 
Taxable 
Income
0.198
(0.060)
0.092
(0.011)
0.014
(0.010)
0.050
(0.006)
–0.011
(0.001)
0.007
(0.001)
–0.001
(0.001)
–0.119
(0.006)
–0.554
(0.014)
–0.201
(0.014)
–0.170
(0.017)
–0.147
(0.020)
–0.021
(0.016)
–0.053
(0.016)
–0.097
(0.022)
–0.204
(0.039)
–0.314
(0.079)
–0.08
(0.049)
4.472
(0.150)
 
449,584 
ln(mtrt+3/mtrt)
Married
Single
Age
Age Squared/10
Age Cubed/100
sex
itemzer_base
ln(income)
decile 1
decile 2
decile 3
decile 4
decile 5
decile 6
decile 7
decile 8
decile 9
decile 10
Constant
Observations
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1988 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. 
The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and 
by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
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TABLE 9
FULL SOI TAXABLE AND BROAD–INCOME ELASTICITIES FOR THE 1980s AND 1990s
No Income Controls Base–Year Income Controls Spline Income Controls
Broad
Income
0.168
(0.028)
0.081
(0.006)
0.012
(0.006)
0.031
(0.004)
–0.009
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
0.006
(0.001)
0.009
(0.003)
–0.529
(0.056)
572,716
Taxable
Income
0.277
(0.045)
0.01
(0.008)
–0.019
(0.008)
0.046
(0.005)
–0.012
(0.001)
0.008
(0.001)
0.004
(0.001)
–0.024
(0.004)
–0.749
(0.070)
699,724
Broad
Income
0.247
(0.027)
0.131
(0.007)
0.029
(0.006)
0.041
(0.003)
–0.01
(0.001)
0.007
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)
–0.076
(0.004)
–0.098
(0.003)
0.363
(0.062)
572,716
Taxable
Income
0.359
(0.044)
0.074
(0.008)
0.002
(0.008)
0.057
(0.004)
–0.013
(0.001)
0.008
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
–0.123
(0.005)
–0.121
(0.003)
0.343
(0.075)
699,724
Broad
Income
0.227
(0.028)
0.141
(0.007)
0.034
(0.006)
0.045
(0.004)
–0.011
(0.001)
0.007
(0.001)
0.003
(0.001)
–0.079
(0.004)
–0.033
(0.122)
–0.203
(0.013)
–0.154
(0.012)
–0.125
(0.014)
–0.133
(0.014)
–0.016
(0.013)
–0.062
(0.013)
–0.101
(0.021)
–0.267
(0.047)
–0.130
(0.038)
–0.217
(0.112)
572,716
Taxable
Income
0.339
(0.045)
0.093
(0.008)
0.017
(0.008)
0.068
(0.004)
–0.015
(0.001)
0.009
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
–0.125
(0.005)
–0.573
(0.011)
–0.218
(0.011)
–0.182
(0.014)
–0.175
(0.017)
–0.062
(0.015)
–0.031
(0.015)
–0.065
(0.018)
–0.143
(0.030)
–0.296
(0.058)
–0.120
(0.037)
4.249
(0.114)
699,724
ln(mtrt+3/mtrt)
Married
Single
Age
Age Squared/10
Age Cubed/100
sex
itemzer_base
ln(income)
decile 1
decile 2
decile 3
decile 4
decile 5
decile 6
decile 7
decile 8
decile 9
decile 10
Constant
Observations
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data for years 1979 to 2001. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. 
The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and 
by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
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For broad income, the SOI–based 
elasticity estimate for the 1980s is much 
larger than the estimate from the CWHS 
(0.21 versus 0.12). For the 1990s, the 
estimates are much closer (0.13 with the 
full SOI and 0.15 with the CWHS). For 
both decades combined, the estimated 
broad–income elasticity is 0.23 (versus 
0.15 with the CWHS), but still smaller than 
the corresponding ETI estimate. While 
the estimates (for broad income) from the 
CWHS are never statistically signiﬁ cant 
at the ﬁ ve–percent level, the SOI–based 
estimates are all statistically signiﬁ cant at 
well above the one percent level.
Adding Demographics to the Model 
Recall that the analysis based on the 
CWHS sample excluded all demographic 
variables except marital status. When 
turning to the full SOI, potentially impor-
tant variables such as gender, age (as well 
as age squared and age cubed) and item-
ization status are added to the model.28 As 
Table 10 shows, including demographics 
results in larger estimated elasticities 
(when using the model that includes a 
ten–piece spline) for the 1980s. The effect 
on the estimated elasticities for the 1990s is 
mixed; here the estimated broad–income 
elasticity falls, while the corresponding 
measure for taxable income remains 
essentially unchanged.
For the 1980s additional demographic 
variables raise the estimated ETI from 0.37 
to 0.43 and the corresponding estimated 
elasticity for broad income from 0.18 to 
0.21. For the 1990s, however, the added 
variables have almost no effect on the 
estimated ETI. For broad income, the cor-
responding estimated elasticity falls from 
0.17 to 0.13. For the full period, the pattern 
of the 1980s tends to dominate. Additional 
demographics raise the estimated ETI, for 
the full period, from 0.28 to 0.34, and the 
estimated broad–income elasticity from 
0.20 to 0.23.
In most cases, the added demograph-
ics show strong statistical significance 
(see Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9). Age, 
included as a third–order polynomial, 
shows strong statistical signiﬁ cance (as 
measured by F–tests) for both time peri-
ods for both broad and taxable income. 
Itemizer status is negative and strongly 
significant. The effect of (the primary 
ﬁ ler’s) gender, on the other hand, is close 
to zero and not statistically signiﬁ cant. 
The effect of demographics on the esti-
mates implies that those new variables 
are somewhat correlated with unobserved 
TABLE 10
INCLUSION OF ADDITIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Added Demographics
 1979 to 1987
 1988 to 1998
 1979 to 1998
(1)
No
0.183
(0.052)
0.174
(0.038)
0.198
(0.029)
(2)
Yes
0.210
(0.048)
0.125
(0.037)
0.227
(0.028)
(3)
No
0.365
(0.083)
0.192
(0.060)
0.276
(0.046)
(4)
Yes
0.425
(0.081)
0.198
(0.060)
0.339
(0.045)
Broad Income Taxable Income
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. The income range 
is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see the 
third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
28 Itemization status is included in order to help capture non–tax–related income patterns that are correlated with 
itemizing. The drawback here is that the decision to itemize could be endogenous, and responsive to changes 
in tax rates. In any event, excluding itemization status from the added demographic variable has almost no 
effect on estimated elasticities for any of the speciﬁ cations or time periods.
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(and non–tax–related) factors that deter-
mine income changes and, thus, may help 
isolate the tax–related portion of changes 
in income.29
Separate Controls for Mean Reversion 
and Divergence in the Income Distribution
Kopczuk (2005) makes a compel-
ling argument that mean reversion 
and non–tax–related divergence in the 
income distribution are two separate 
phenomena and that it is unlikely that 
one variable will capture both effects. To 
address this, Kopczuk includes separate 
variables to control for each of the two 
different phenomena. To account for 
mean reversion, Kopczuk includes a 
function of income in the year preceding 
the base year. To control for divergence 
in the income distribution, he includes a 
function of the difference between current 
(or base–year) income and income in the 
preceding year.
To examine the implications of using 
one variable to control for both income 
divergence and mean reversion, I explore 
two speciﬁ cations employed by Kopczuk 
and ﬁ nd that using his strongest set of 
controls has a modest and negative effect 
on the estimated ETI for the 1980s, but 
a larger and positive effect on the esti-
mate for the 1990s. In one speciﬁ cation, 
I include both of the control variables 
(lagged income and the change in income 
from the previous to the current year) in 
log form; in the other, I include the same 
variables as ten–piece splines. When 
including the two variables in log form, 
the biggest change is observed for the 
1980s, where the estimated ETI rises by 
almost 0.05 (when compared to results 
from the model that includes the log of 
base–year income) (see Table 11). When 
including the two logged variables as 
ten–piece splines, in place of a ten–piece 
spline of log income, the estimated ETI 
falls from 0.43 to 0.40, when compared to 
the corresponding estimate for the 1980s, 
and for the full period, the estimate is 
virtually unchanged. For the 1990s the 
impact is greater, raising the estimate from 
0.20 to 0.26.
Separately Estimated Responses for 
State and Federal Tax Rates
The inclusion of state tax rates in the 
marginal rate calculation adds a source 
of cross–sectional variation across indi-
viduals who may be very similar in other 
respects (such as income). Including 
this cross–sectional variation may be 
important in identifying taxable income 
TABLE 11
SEPARATE CONTROLS FOR MEAN REVERSION AND DIVERGENCE IN THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Income Controls
ln(taxable incomet–1) and ln(taxable incomet/taxable incomet–1) 
Spline of ln(taxable incomet–1) and spline of ln(taxable incomet/taxable incomet–1)
Observations
1980 to 
1987
0.666
(0.116)
0.400
(0.108)
148,837
1988 to 
1998
0.191
(0.059)
0.264
(0.060)
350,030
1980 to 
1998
0.334
(0.053)
0.345
(0.056)
498,867
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions. The income range 
is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see the 
third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) are in parentheses.
29 Dropping ﬁ lers with base–year ages greater than 60 and excluding the age variables results in estimates that 
are almost the same as the core results, which include full demographics and impose no age restrictions. This 
suggests that retirement patterns, which are often associated with large drops in income, were likely not bias-
ing earlier estimates from datasets that did not include age.
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responses because exogenous income 
trends, which are known to ﬂ uctuate from 
year to year and to vary greatly across 
the taxable income distribution, pose 
problems for other identiﬁ cation strate-
gies. Furthermore, excluding changes to 
state rates would likely bias the net–of–tax 
rate variable, thus contaminating the ETI 
estimates.
A caveat to including state rates is that, 
to some degree, state tax rates are likely 
endogenous because some people base 
their decision to live in a particular state, 
at least partially, on its tax system.30 Feld-
stein and Wrobel (1998) contend that states 
are limited in their ability to redistribute 
income. A move toward a more progres-
sive state tax system, it is argued, will be 
met by out–migration of high–paying 
jobs. For this state, pre–tax wages would 
rise (and employment would fall) in the 
high–skilled sector, resulting in the same 
level of after–tax income inequality.31 The 
endogeneity of state rates is not neces-
sarily an issue when state rates increase 
uniformly across the income distribution, 
and these increased revenues are used to 
provide services whose beneﬁ ts are also 
widespread. It is much more likely to be 
relevant when states alter the progres-
sivity of their tax system, or alter their 
rates uniformly without commensurate 
changes to government services.32 In 
sum, migration in response to state tax 
changes is in itself a behavioral response 
to taxation, but one that complicates the 
ETI estimation process.33
While it is not known how great the role 
of interstate migration and wage capital-
ization is when analyzing changes to state 
tax rates, it is possible to estimate elas-
ticities for models that exclude variation 
resulting from federal rates, and for models 
that exclude variation resulting from state 
tax rates. Simply excluding one component 
of the overall marginal rate will likely add 
little insight because doing so presumes 
that one component of the overall marginal 
rate is responsible for the entire tax effect. 
Thus, the log change in the overall tax rate 
is still used as the key dependent variable, 
but in one specification the predicted 
log change in the state rate is used as an 
instrument (instead of the corresponding 
change resulting from changes to both 
federal and state law) and in the other the 
predicted log change for only the federal 
rate is used as an instrument. Therefore, on 
average the key dependent variable will 
be the same as before, but the variation 
in this variable will now be based on only 
one of the two components of the overall 
marginal tax rate.
The model that includes a ten–piece 
spline and uses just the federal rate as an 
instrument yields estimates that are very 
similar to those from the corresponding 
model that includes variation from the 
combination of federal and state tax rates. 
This is true for both broad and taxable 
income (see Panel 1 of Table 12). 
Including only variation from state 
net–of–tax rates yields ETI estimates that 
are somewhat smaller than when both 
30 As anecdotal evidence of that possibility, a number of high–paid celebrities have moved their primary resi-
dences from high–tax states, such as California, to low–tax states, such as Florida, Texas, and Nevada, which 
do not have state income taxes. The phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “Tiger Woods Effect” (Jones, 
2003). Woods, who grew up in California and attended Stanford University, moved his primary residence from 
California to Florida shortly after turning professional. Woods recently remarked, “We’re deﬁ nitely residing 
in Florida and I don’t see why we should leave—especially with zero income tax” (Harig, 2004).
31 Analogously, transfers to low–income workers will lead to an inﬂ ow of low–skilled workers, pushing down 
their pre–transfer income.
32 For example, if a state enacts a proportional increase in its tax burden, that does not result in greater or im-
proved government services.
33 It is likely that migration is motivated by average tax rates, controlling for the level of government services, 
as opposed to marginal rates, which drive behavioral responses to federal rate changes (or in situations where 
migration is prohibitively expensive).
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federal and state or only federal rate 
changes are included (see Panel 2 of Table 
12). The estimated ETI with only variation 
from state rates is 0.34 for the 1980s. The 
estimated ETI is just 0.11 for the 1990s and 
0.23 for the full period. For broad income, 
the estimated elasticity is much larger for 
the 1980s when including only variation 
in state rates (0.37 versus 0.21 when both 
state and federal rates are included). For 
the 1990s, the estimated broad income 
elasticity (0.08) is slightly smaller than the 
earlier estimate and much smaller than the 
estimate for the 1980s. For the full period, 
the estimated broad–income elasticity is 
about the same as when only variation 
in federal rates is included or when both 
state and federal rates are included.
Permanent versus Transitory Responses
While the model is designed to cap-
ture permanent rather than transitory 
responses, the degree to which is does 
this is open to question. Focusing on 
changes in behavior over three–year 
intervals is intended to isolate permanent 
responses. But that comparison may not 
remove transitory influences from the 
elasticity estimates. Many of the years 
in both the 1980s and1990s are likely to 
include some transitory behavior, in part 
because of multiyear phase–in periods. 
Thus, comparing observations three years 
apart is unlikely to avoid transitory ﬂ uc-
tuations. If those transitory ﬂ uctuations 
severely contaminate measurement of 
the permanent responses, differences in 
ETI estimates for the two periods may 
result simply from noise. To test this 
possibility, the ETI is re–estimated after 
excluding all paired observations that 
include years 1981, 1982, 1986, 1987, 1993, 
1994 and 2001. For the full time period, the 
overall estimated ETI is 0.30 (versus 0.34 
when no years are dropped) and strongly 
signiﬁ cant. The corresponding estimated 
ETI is 0.36 for the 1980s and 0.15 for the 
1990s. The fact that the estimates are all 
a little smaller than the corresponding 
estimates that do not exclude any years 
suggests that the overall estimates may 
contain both a permanent plus a small 
transitory component. However, this is 
far from conclusive—especially since the 
1980s estimate is no longer statistically 
signiﬁ cant (see Table 13).
Why Might Estimates for the 1980s and 
1990s Differ?
Three competing interpretations might 
explain the differences between the results 
from the 1980s and the 1990s:
1. The model does a good job of 
explaining overall behavior for 
both the 1980s and the 1990s, but 
differences in policy and economic 
factors caused the ETI to fall between 
the two periods. That hypothesis is 
consistent with the view of Slemrod 
and Kopczuk (2002), who argue that 
the ETI is not a structural parameter 
TABLE 12
COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES USING FEDERAL AND STATE MARGINAL TAX RATESa
Panel 1: Federal Rates Only Panel 2: State Rates Only
Taxable Income
Broad Income
1979 to 1987
0.423
(0.061)
0.205
(0.046)
1988 to 1998
0.212
(0.060)
0.11
(0.037)
1979 to 1998
0.347
(0.038)
0.192
(0.026)
1979 to 1987
0.343
(0.098)
0.365
(0.070)
1988 to 1998
0.105
(0.103)
0.081
(0.059)
1979 to 1998
0.226
(0.066)
0.215
(0.041)
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions and include a 
10–Piece Spline of ln(Income). The income range is $10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the inverse 
of sampling probabilities and by income (see the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered by individual) 
are in parentheses. Coefﬁ cients other than the elasticities are suppressed. 
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and is a function of more than prefer-
ences. If the different estimates are 
due solely to changes in the base, 
then an estimate for the 1990s (or any 
other period) can be imputed from 
Kopczuk’s estimated coefficients 
and a measure of the tax base.34 
Kopczuk’s measure of the tax base, 
which is intended to proxy the cost 
of shifting income from inside to out-
side the tax base, has been relatively 
constant post–TRA 86. Inserting the 
tax base for the 1990s into his esti-
mated equations suggests that the 
ETI should be two to four percentage 
points lower in the 1990s than it was 
pre–1986. That would explain 14 to 
29 percent of the difference between 
my estimates for the 1980s and 1990s. 
Of couse, Kopczuk’s measure is 
an imperfect proxy for the cost of 
shielding income from taxation. It is 
possible that a better measure would 
explain more of the difference (or 
possibly less).35
2. The model is misspeciﬁ ed and does a 
poor job of isolating the response of 
taxable income to tax rate changes in 
either period—even when employ-
ing separate controls for mean rever-
sion and non–tax–related divergence 
in the income distribution. During 
the 1980s, for example, reported 
taxable incomes were rising, and the 
share of taxable income reported by 
the top of the income distribution 
was growing rapidly. At the same 
time, marginal tax rates were falling, 
with the largest reductions at the 
high end of the income distribution. 
Thus, the larger estimated ETIs for 
the 1980s might occur not because 
the true response was greater, but 
because the model fails to control 
fully for the correlation between 
non–tax–related growth in income 
(especially at the top of the distri-
bution) and falling tax rates. In the 
1990s, the correlation between tax 
rates and income was reversed: The 
trend in income at the high end con-
tinued, and marginal tax rates were 
increasing as a result of the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1990 
and 1993. For the 1990s, the failure 
to control fully for that correlation 
biases estimated ETIs downward, 
the opposite of the upward bias for 
the 1980s. Lending credence to that 
interpretation is the fact that the 
rate cuts of the 1990s applied only 
to upper–income groups, which 
are usually more responsive to tax 
TABLE 13
FULL SOI ESTIMATES AFTER EXCLUDING 
YEARS THAT ARE THE MOST LIKELY CONTAIN 
TRANSITORY BEHAVIOR
1979 to 1987
Obs
1988 to 1998
Obs
1979 to 1998
Obs
Broad 
Income
0.102
(0.113)
64,769
0.076
(0.048)
291,611
0.183
(0.040)
356,380
Taxable 
Income
0.356
(0.255)
57,709
0.149
(0.074)
255,492
0.299
(0.064)
313,209
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income 
data. Estimates are from 2SLS regressions and include 
a 10–Piece Spline of ln(Income). The income range is 
$10,000 and above. Regressions are weighted by the 
inverse of sampling probabilities and by income (see 
the third section). Robust standard errors (clustered 
by individual) are in parentheses. Coefﬁ cients other 
than the elasticities are suppressed. 
34 Kopczuk’s measure of the tax base is the share of income subject to tax—i.e., taxable income (plus certain 
deductions and exclusions that are not affected by behavior) divided by total income. His model includes 
two separate explanatory variables that are functions of the marginal tax rate. One is the net–of–tax rate; the 
other is one minus the tax base (share) interacted with the net–of–tax rate.
35 Another interpretation in support of the model is that people simply respond differently to rate cuts than they 
do to rate increases.
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rates than are other groups. Thus, 
it is somewhat surprising that the 
estimated ETI is lower, rather than 
higher, for the 1990s.
3. The model and data may fail to 
capture some potentially important 
types of income shifting. For exam-
ple, the shifting of income between 
the corporate and individual base 
is often not observed. Incentives 
for this type of shifting were more 
prevalent for the 1980s than for the 
1990s. The mostly unobserved shift-
ing of income from subchapter C to 
subchapter S corporations following 
TRA 86 likely played a large role in 
biasing some of the early ETI esti-
mates for TRA 86 (see Slemrod, 1996). 
Additionally, Saez (2004) attributes 
much of the income increase at the 
very top of the income distribution 
following ERTA 1981 to a surge in 
income from subchapter S corpora-
tions. This income surge could have 
arisen from a number of sources, 
including: tax–induced changes in 
real economic activity; the shifting 
of income from subchapter C to 
subchapter S corporations; and an 
exogenous (non–tax–related) change 
in economic activity. The potential 
measurement problems created from 
income shifting between subchapter 
C and S, as well as the possibility of 
not fully accounting for non–tax–
related changes in economic activity 
(that affect subchapter S income) are 
mitigated by excluding subchapter 
S income from the analysis. It is still 
possible that better accounting of 
income shifting between corporate 
and individual bases—shifting 
between subchapters S and C is just 
one piece of the puzzle—could help 
explain why the estimates for the 
two decades are different.
Estimates for High–Income Filers from 
the Full SOI
A number of studies have found that 
estimated ETIs vary greatly by income, 
and that overall responses may be driven 
by high–income ﬁ lers. While comparing 
dollar–weighted and person–weighted 
estimates (which are generally much 
smaller) also suggests this, the possibility 
is explored further by using the full SOI to 
generate ETI estimates that apply speciﬁ -
cally to high–income ﬁ lers.
Table 14 presents income–weighted ETI 
estimates for the 1980s, 1990s, and for both 
decades combined after excluding those 
with less than $100,000 of base–year broad 
income. With that income restriction, the 
1980s and 1990s estimates are very similar 
to the full–sample SOI estimates for the 
respective periods. For both decades com-
bined, though, the estimated ETI is 0.44 
(versus 0.34 for the sample without the 
higher–income restriction), which is actu-
ally larger than either the 1980s or 1990s 
estimate.36 Note that restricting the sample 
to those with incomes over $100,000 alters 
a potentially important source for iden-
tiﬁ cation. That is, the exclusion reduces 
degree of cross–sectional variation in tax 
TABLE 14
FULL SOI DOLLAR–WEIGHTED 
TAXABLE–INCOME ELASTICITIES 
FOR UPPER–INCOME FILERS
Time–Period
1979 to 1998
1979 to 1987
1988 to 1998
ETI
$100k and Up
0.441
(0.089)
0.426
(0.148)
0.232
(0.098)
Notes: Estimates are based on Statistics of Income 
data for years 1979 to 2001. Estimates are based on 
the speciﬁ cation with a 10–piece spline. Regressions 
are weighted by the inverse of sampling probabilities 
and by income (see the third section). Robust standard 
errors (clustered by individual) are in parenthesis.
36 The estimate for the 1980s (for those with income over $100,000) is 0.43. For comparison, Gruber and Saez, 
using the CWHS, reported an estimated ETI of 0.57 when making this same restriction to the sample.
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rate changes and, thus, the behavior of 
those with less than $100,000 of income 
is no longer used to help explain coun-
terfactual income trends. Whether this 
hampers or improves the identiﬁ cation 
process depends partly on whether the 
non–tax–related behavior of the excluded 
group is similar to that of the included 
higher–income group. 
CONCLUSION
This paper builds on Gruber and Saez 
(2002). In addition to replicating Gruber 
and Saez’s core results using CWHS 
data, a number of sensitivity analyses 
are conducted, including extending the 
data through the 1990s—so that the full 
period includes both tax increases and tax 
decreases. After ﬁ nding evidence that the 
CWHS results may not be robust because 
of the small number of very–high–income 
ﬁ lers, the analysis is repeated using the 
full SOI—a much larger dataset that 
includes the CWHS, but also heavily 
over–samples high–income ﬁ lers.
One important finding is that when 
employing identical methodologies, 
estimated ETIs for the tax increases of 
the 1990s are generally much smaller 
(about half the size) than estimates for 
the tax cuts of the 1980s. A second ﬁ nding 
is that although sample sizes are quite 
large, CWHS–based ETI estimates for the 
1990s are not statistically signiﬁ cant. This 
is partly due to income–weighting the 
regressions, which places much greater 
emphasis on the responses of high–income 
ﬁ lers and, thus, makes the size of the sam-
ple somewhat misleading. Additionally, 
despite the large sample size, a dfbeta test 
for the 1980s shows that results depend 
heavily on a few very–high–income obser-
vations. However, moving to the full SOI 
results in estimated ETIs that are gener-
ally similar in magnitude to the CWHS 
estimates, but with much smaller standard 
errors. This suggests that the CWHS, while 
inferior to the full SOI, may well be a use-
ful data source for examining behavior 
often dominated by very–high–income 
ﬁ lers. A third ﬁ nding is that using separate 
control variables for mean reversion and 
divergence within the income distribu-
tion has a modest and negative effect on 
estimated ETIs for the 1980s and a positive 
and larger effect on estimates for the 1990s 
(when compared to results from analogous 
models that include just one variable to 
account for both phenomena).
The addition of high–income ﬁ lers from 
the SOI, along with a panel that spans over 
20 years and includes both tax increases 
and tax decreases, yields results that are 
more robust than many previous studies. 
This paper suggests a relatively narrow 
range of plausible estimates for the ETI. 
However, the factors that underlie income 
changes are tremendously complex and 
there remains variation across speciﬁ ca-
tions and across time periods that is not 
well understood. Furthermore, other 
credible studies suggest a wider range of 
plausible estimates (see Giertz (2006) and 
Heim (2007)).
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